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In drafting cooperative federalism statutes, which rely on state
government bodies to design and implement local regulation accord-
ing to national standards,' Congress has generally provided for private
suits against state regulators to ensure that the states properly carry
out the regulatory tasks they undertake on Congress's behalf.' The
strengthening of the state sovereign immunity doctrine, a prominent
aspect of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival,' has thrown sev-
eral hurdles in the way of private litigation against states under these
statutes.
Congress may no longer directly abrogate states' sovereign im-
munity through statutes passed pursuant to its Article I powers; the
Court sees this as necessary to avert the dignitary harm to the states of
being hauled into court by private attorneys general.' As a result, most
suits that proceed against the states under cooperative federalism
statutes do so under the Ex Parte Young fiction, which allows plaintiffs
to sue state officials for prospective relief for ongoing violations of
federal law. This route, however, is less effective than it once was.6
Additionally, Congress may still authorize private litigation
against the states through a constructive waiver of their sovereign
immunity-the subject of this Comment. While the Supreme Court
has substantially narrowed the constructive waiver exception to pre-
vent Congress from using it to make an end-run around the abroga-
tion ban,' it has not, as some have urged, written it out of the law. Con-
t B.A. 1996, Williams College. J.D. 2003, The University of Chicago.
I See text accompanying note 15.
2 See Part 1.B.
3 See Richard A. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U Chi L Rev 429,429-30 (2002) (noting that since 1991 "the Court has maintained
a relatively stable five-justice majority ... committed to enforcing limits on national power and
to protecting the integrity of the states" that "[c]ommentators unhesitatingly refer to [as) a fed-
eralism 'revival').
4 With the exception of legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Part H.A.
5 See generally Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908).
6 Two recent Supreme Court opinions have rendered Ex Parte Young suits difficult and
uncertain. See Idaho v Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 US 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v Flor-
ida, 517 US 44 (1996). For a full discussion of these cases, see Part II.A.
7 See College Savings Bank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,
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structive waiver may still be obtained from a state as long as it is vol-
untarily exchanged for some sort of "gratuity" from the federal gov-
ernment.' Because the Supreme Court has only accepted one some-
what obscure incidence of constructive waiver, few plaintiffs have at-
tempted to use this theory for suits brought under cooperative feder-
alism statutes.
In the past few years, a series of circuit court cases under the 1996
Telecommunications Act (Telecom Act)' established a new category of
constructive waiver-which I shall call "regulation as waiver"
-allowing Congress to render states amenable to suit in their role as
regulators under cooperative federalism schemes. Under the theory
advanced in these cases, Congress can obtain a constructive (as op-
posed to explicit) waiver from the states by granting them the gratuity
of the opportunity to participate in regulatory activity that would oth-
erwise be foreclosed to them by federal occupation of the field.'0 In
other words, states will be presumed to have constructively waived
their sovereign immunity by agreeing to participate as regulators in
cooperative federalism regulatory schemes, where the federal statute
makes it clear that the state will be subject to suit in federal court for
its actions as regulator. This is a positive doctrinal development from
the policy-design perspective, as Congress can ensure when it invites
the states to act alongside it as regulators that states are as account-
able as the federal government for how they carry out that regulation.
The regulation as waiver theory's validity remains open to ques-
tion in the federal courts. Although the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Cir-
cuits have accepted the theory," the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have re-
jected it.'2 The Supreme Court agreed to address the theory's validity
527 US 666,675-87 (1999).
8 See Part I1.B (discussing implications of College Savings Bank on the constructive
waiver doctrine).
') Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996), codified in vari-
ous sections of 47 USC (2000). The language at issue is contained in 47 USC §§ 251-52 (2000).
14 See AT&T Communications v BellSouth Telecommunications, 238 F3d 636,645-46 (5th
Cir 2001) (stating that Congress can obtain a non-verbal regulatory waiver); MCI Telecommuni-
cations Corp v Illinois Bell Telephone Co, 222 F3d 323, 342 (7th Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US
1132 (2001) (finding that states voluntarily waive their sovereign immunity by accepting the "in-
vitation to act as regulators of the local telephone market"); MCI Telecommunications Corp v
Public Service Commission of Utah, 216 F3d 929, 938 (10th Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1183
(2001) (finding that Congress clearly "condition[ed] a state's ability to regulate local phone ser-
vice," a gratuity, on the state's "consent to suit in federal court").
1 See note 10.
12 See Bell Atlantic Maryland v MCI Worldcom, 240 F3d 279,309 (4th Cir 2001) (conclud-
ing that state participation in the regulation of interconnection agreements did not result in a
waiver of sovereign immunity); Michigan Bell v Climax Telephone, 202 F3d 862,867 n 2 (6th Cir
2000) (peremptorily rejecting the regulation as waiver theory). See also Stephanie Chapman,
Note, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Service Commission: The Tenth Circuit Rebuffs
the Supreme Court Trend Supporting State Immunity, 55 Okla L Rev 175 (2002) (criticizing regu-
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in a recent case concerning the Telecom Act, but ultimately ruled that
the suit could go forward under Ex Parte Young.'3
Now that the Supreme Court has given its blessing to Ex Parte
Young suits under the Telecom Act, private litigants subject to the Act
should generally be expected to proceed by that route. However, the
regulation as waiver theory has potentially interesting implications for
plaintiffs pursuing private litigation against the states under coopera-
tive federalism statutes in general. While private plaintiffs may techni-
cally proceed under the Ex Parte Young theory, states are aggressively
asserting various new exceptions to the doctrine, rendering whether
Ex Parte Young creates an exception to state sovereign immunity in
the context of a particular statute or for a particular plaintiff a focus of
litigation in every one of these suits.
This Comment argues that regulation as waiver at once provides
a viable alternative route for private litigation under cooperative fed-
eralism statutes, and comports well with current state sovereign im-
munity doctrine. Part I of this Comment introduces the cooperative
federalism model, and the importance of private litigation to this
model. Part II sketches out the limitations that the Supreme Court's
current state sovereign immunity jurisprudence places on private liti-
gation under cooperative federalism schemes, presents the regulation
as waiver theory, and discusses how it has been received in the courts.
Finally, Part III argues that regulation as waiver not only clearly fits
within the bounds of the Court's constructive waiver doctrine, but also
helps promote the larger goals of the federalism revival. Unless the
scope of Congress's regulatory powers is curtailed more sharply than
it has been, the reality will remain that Congress possesses and uses
the ability to regulate almost every corner of American economic life.
The cooperative federalism model carves out a significant role for the
states in the regulation of many of those areas. Insofar as the availabil-
ity of regulation as waiver preserves cooperative federalism as an at-
tractive regulatory model for Congress, without violating the impera-
lation as waiver as barred by a recent Supreme Court opinion on constructive waiver); Recent
Cases: Seventh Circuit Holds That States Waive Sovereign Immunity by Arbitrating Interconnec-
tion Agreements under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 114 Harv L Rev 1819 (2001) (same).
13 See Mathias v Worldcom Technologies. 532 US 903 (2001), cert dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 535 US 682 (2002), and subsequently denied as Illinois Bell v WorldCom, 535 US
1107 (2002) (certifying "[w]hether a state commission's acceptance of Congress' invitation to
participate in implementing a federal regulatory scheme that provides that state commission de-
terminations are reviewable in federal court constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity"). But see Verizon v Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 US 635,645 (2002) (de-
termining that "[wihether the Commission waived its immunity is [a] question we need not de-
cide, because ... even absent waiver, [plaintiff] may proceed against the individual commission-
ers in their official capacities, pursuant to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young").
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tive that states give up their immunity voluntarily, advocates of a ro-
bust system of dual sovereignty should cheer.
I. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,'4
when enacting regulation pursuant to any of its enumerated powers,
Congress may completely displace state regulation and implement a
purely federal regulatory scheme. However, in a variety of fields, it
may see an advantage to regulating in partnership with local govern-
ments, and would therefore turn to the cooperative federalism model,
carving out a role for state bodies in areas governed by preemptive
federal regulation. Congress generally includes provisions authorizing
private suit against state regulators in these statutes to ensure their
enforcement.
A. Cooperative Federalism Statutes
As defined by the Supreme Court, cooperative federalism stat-
utes are federal laws adopted pursuant to Congress's "authority to
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause," that "offer
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal stan-
dards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."" Starting
with the passage of several major environmental statutes" in the 1970s,
Congress has "repeatedly endorsed the cooperative federalism strat-
egy."' 7 More diverse cooperative federalism regulatory schemes in-
clude: Medicaid," the Occupational Safety and Health Act," the Public
14 US Const Art VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
15 New York v United States, 505 US 144, 167 (1992).
16 These include the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (also known as the Clean
Air Act), Pub L No 91-604,84 Stat 1676 (1970), codified at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (2000); the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (also known as the Clean Water Act), Pub L No
92-500, 86 Stat 816 (1972), codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq (2000); the Solid Waste Disposal Act,
Pub L No 89-272, 79 Stat 997 (1965), as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, Pub L No 94-580,90 Stat 2795 (1976), codified at 42 USC § 6901 et seq (2000); and the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub L No 95-87, 91 Stat 445 (1977), codified at 30
USC § 1201 et seq (2000).
17 Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of
the Telecom Act, 76 NYU L Rev t692, 1694 (2001).
18 Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Pub L No 103-66,107 Stat 624 (1965), codified at 42
USC § 1396 et seq (2000) (granting medical assistance funds to states, conditioned on approval
of state plans).
19 Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590 (1970), codified at 29 USC § 651 et seq (2000). See 29
USC § 667(b) (giving states the option of preempting federal regulation if they "assume respon-
sibility for development and enforcement" of occupational health and safety).
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Utility Regulatory Policies Act,"' the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act,2' and the Cable Communications Policy Act.22
These statutes rely on local government bodies to design and
implement local regulation according to national standards. The Clean
Air Act, for example, sets national ambient air quality standards," but
charges the states with achieving them through state implementation
plans designed by the states and approved by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA).24 The Telecom Act, which mandates that local
telephone monopolies enter into interconnection agreements with
would-be competitors," invests state commissions with primary re-
sponsibility for enforcing those interconnection agreements." By hav-
ing the local government bodies implement federal regulation locally,
these statutes preserve a role for the states in areas that the federal
political branches have decided it is in the nation's best interest to
regulate according to a central design.
B. The Role of Private Litigation in Cooperative Federalism
Cooperative federalism statutes generally provide private citizens
with a right of action to sue both federal and state regulatory bodies
responsible for their implementation. Congress's express purpose in
making these provisions is to vindicate the rights of the regulated
community that may be impinged upon in the course of regulation,
and to make sure that the states hold up their end of the regulatory
bargain. This mirrors the system through which the federal govern-
ment makes itself accountable under purely federal regulatory
schemes.
1. Rights-vindicating provisions.
As the growth of the administrative state brought more and more
activity within the ambit of federal regulation, the federal government
20 Pub L No 95-617, 92 Stat 3117 (1978), codified at 16 USC § 2601 et seq (2000). See 16
USC § 824a-3(f) (requiring states to implement standards promulgated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission).
21 Pub L No 96-272,94 Stat 500 (1980), codified at 42 USC § 675 (2000).
22 Pub L No 98-549.98 Stat 2779 (1984), codified at 47 USC §§ 571-73 (2000).
23 42 USC § 7409.
24 Id § 7410(a).
25 47 USC § 251(c)(1) (requiring incumbent telecommunications service providers to nego-
tiate interconnection agreements with new entrants in good faith).
26 See generally id § 251. If private negotiation of an interconnection agreement fails, ei-
ther party can petition the state commission that regulates local phone service to arbitrate. See id
§ 252(b)(1). Once an agreement is concluded-by either negotiation or arbitration-it must be
submitted for approval to the state commission, which may reject the agreement if it does not
comply with Section 251 of the Act. Id § 252(e)(1)-(2).
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made itself amenable to suit under the Administrative Procedure Act27
and various individual regulatory statutes' to prevent federal regula-
tors from abusing their powers at the regulated community's ex-
pense. " When Congress began to use the cooperative federalism
model, it naturally provided causes of action in cooperative federalism
statutes against both federal and state agencies. This ensures the same
kind of accountability, regardless of whether a state or federal agency
happened to be carrying out a certain portion of the federal regula-
tion. The section of the Telecom Act governing interconnection
agreements, for instance, provides that "in any case in which a State
commission makes a determination under this section, any party ag-
grieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate
Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or state-
ment meets the requirements" of the Act."
2. Citizen suit provisions.
Standing to sue under most federal regulatory statutes does not
end with the regulated community. In the past thirty years, Congress
has also included citizen suit provisions in a wide range of federal
regulatory statutes, granting private citizens the right to sue adminis-
trators for failing to enforce the laws as Congress requires."' While
there is some controversy about the efficacy of citizen suits in address-
ing the problem of federal agency inaction," the idea is that the threat
27 5 USC § 551 et seq (2000). Section 10 of the Act, codified at 5 USC §§ 701-06, provides
for judicial review at the behest of parties that suffer legal wrong due to final agency action.
28 Many statutes give aggrieved parties the right to seek judicial review of agency actions
in federal court. See, for example, National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 160(f) (2000) (provid-
ing that final orders of the National Labor Relations Board may be reviewed in federal courts of
appeals); Social Security Act § 205(g), 42 USC § 405(g) (2000) (providing for federal district
court review of final and adverse administrative decisions on social security claims). Others ren-
der agency actions binding only when the agency brings an enforcement action in federal court,
at which point adversely affected parties may contest the actions. See, for example, Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 USC § I I705(c)-(d) (2000) (orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission); Packers and Stockyards Act § 309(f), 7 USC §§ 210(f), 499g(b) (2000)
(selected orders of the Department of Agriculture).
29 See, for example, National Wildlife Federation v United States, 626 F2d 917, 918 n 1,923
(DC Cir 1980) (stating that federal courts have the power to command federal officers to fulfill
their obligations).
30 47 USC § 252(e)(6).
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Arti-
cle 11, 91 Mich L Rev 163, 165 n 11 (1992) (listing "the large number of statutes" in which Con-
gress used the citizen suit "as a mechanism for controlling unlawfully inadequate enforcement of
the law"). See also id at 192-93.
32 See, for example, Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Rulemaking, 78 NC L Rev 1013, 1023 (2000) ("When a regulator must anticipate and
adapt to every conceivable challenge and the reaction of the most hostile judge, she is destined
to spend most of her time 'playing defense' with little time left for taking regulatory affirmative
action.").
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of citizen suits will motivate regulators to carry out their mandates
and take action against violators.
Citizen suit provisions figure prominently in most cooperative
federalism statutes." Again, they are intended as a guarantee that
regulation-whether by federal or state agencies-will occur as prom-
ised, and that the statutes will be rigorously enforced. The Clean Air
Act's citizen suit provision, for example, "reflected a deliberate choice
by Congress to widen citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental
and effective assurance that the Act would be implemented and en-
forced."'
In an ideal world, citizen suits would not be necessary for en-
forcement: The federal or state agency charged with implementing a
federal regulation would carry out its mandate in accordance with the
law. But agencies may become overloaded or bogged down in bureau-
cratic inertia. More insidiously, they may implicitly or explicitly bend
to interest group pressure that discourages them from carrying out
their regulatory tasks. As one commentator has noted: "Theoretically,
the governments adopting the standards should enforce them, but in
practice governments and their regulatory agencies often come to
identify with the industries or companies they regulate.""' At the state
level, danger of interest group capture can be particularly acute, lead-
ing to no or nominal regulation.' At the same time, federal agencies
33 In the Clean Air Act, for example, Congress included a citizen suit provision which pro-
vides that any person may bring suit against the federal government or "any other governmental
instrumentality or agency" that fails to properly implement the aspect of the Act with which it is
charged. See 42 USC § 7604(a) (providing that any person may "commence a civil action on his
own behalf-(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other govern-
mental instrumentality or agency) ... who is alleged to have violated ... or to be in violation of..
. an emission standard or limitation under this chapter"). Failure to implement a state implemen-
tation plan (SIP) or revisions of a SIP without EPA approval are considered "violations," for
which the state regulator can be held accountable. See, for example, Sweat v Hull, 200 F Supp 2d
1162,1171 (D Ariz 2001) ("[Tlhe Court finds, as a matter of law, that the repeal of the RSD Pro-
gram, and in turn Arizona's subsequent non-enforcement of the EPA-approved SIP, constituted
a violation of federal law."), citing 42 USC § 7416.
34 Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc v Train, 510 F2d 692, 700 (DC Cir 1975), citing
National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, S Rep No 1196, 91st Cong, 2d Sess 64 (1970), re-
printed in Environmental Policy Division of the Congressional Research Service, 1 A Legislative
History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 464 (GPO 1974); Baughman v Bradford Coal Co,
592 F2d 215, 218 (3d Cir 1979) (noting that Congress intended the citizen suit provision in the
Clean Air Act to enable citizens to "goad[] responsible agencies to more vigorous enforcement
of the anti-pollution standards"); Friends of the Earth v Carey, 535 F2d 165, 173 (2d Cir 1976)
("[Tihe very purpose of the citizens' liberal right of action is to stir slumbering agencies.").
35 Richard L. Ottinger, Renewable Energy Sources for Development, 32 Envir L 331, 352
(2002).
36 See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S Cal L Rev 1, 33 (2002) ("Apparently some
states routinely collude with polluters by issuing token compliance orders solely to preempt citi-
zen suits."); Susan George, William J. Snape Ill, and Rina Rodriguez, The Public in Action, 6 U
Bait J Envir L 1, 7 (1997) ("Government agencies may ... be unwilling to fully enforce applica-
ble laws, responding either to local political pressures or short-term economic opportunities. De-
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lack the resources to discover each instance of underenforcement at
the state level and take court action to force the state agencies to
regulate."
II. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM STATUTES
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution provides that:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.""9 While the text of the Eleventh
Amendment does not appear to immunize a state from suits brought
by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
Amendment broadly to mean that "an unconsenting State is immune
from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by
citizens of another state."" However, at the time Congress began using
the cooperative federalism model, the Court's state sovereign immu-
nity jurisprudence allowed Congress to render states amenable to suit
in federal court, either by obtaining constructive waiver of their im-
munity"' or directly abrogating their immunity in laws passed pursuant
to its Article I powers.
This understanding changed when the Court handed down Semi-
nole Tribe v Florida42 in 1996 and College Savings Bank v Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Education Expense Board3 in 1999. In Seminole
pending on the political leadership in the state, enforcement may even be actively discour-
aged.").
37 See David M. Whalin, John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice: State Sovereignty, Ju-
dicial Review, and Environmental Law after June 23,1999,27 BC Envir Aff L Rev 193,239 (2000)
(noting that "the federal government does not, and will not, have unlimited prosecutorial re-
sources" to pursue environmental claims against states if private citizens cannot).
38 US Const Amend XI.
39 Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651, 662-63 (1974). While a literal reading of the Eleventh
Amendment might lead to the conclusion that citizens of a state may sue their own state in fed-
eral court, this reading was rejected over a century ago in Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 15 (1890)
(holding that appealing to the letter of the Eleventh Amendment as grounds for "sustaining a
suit brought by an individual against a State" is "an attempt to strain the Constitution and the
law to a construction never imagined"). That a non-consenting state cannot be sued by citizens of
any state remains the modern understanding. See Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44,54,66-68
(1996).
40 See Parden v Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, 377 US 184, 192-93
(1964) (finding that Alabama had consented to suit by operating a railroad in interstate com-
merce after Congress had conditioned operation upon amenability to suit).
41 See Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co, 491 US 1, 19-20 (1989) (finding that the Commerce
Clause granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, on the logic that the
Article I grant of power to regulate interstate commerce would be "incomplete without the au-
thority to render States liable in damages").
42 517 US 44 (1996).
43 527 US 666 (1999).
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Tribe, the Court ruled that Congress did not have the power to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity except through the exercise of its Four-
teenth Amendment enforcement powers.' In essence, the Court was
saying that since state sovereign immunity is a constitutionally pro-
41tected right, Congress cannot just legislate it away.
In College Savings, on a narrow reading, the Court ruled that
Congress could not obtain constructive waiver of state sovereign im-
munity merely by specifying that actors-including state actors-
participating in regulated activity would be subject to suit in federal
court. Given some rather stern language in the opinion that casts
aspersions on the concept of constructive waiver as an "end-run"
around Seminole Tribe's abrogation ban, it is possible to read College
Savings more broadly to write constructive waiver out of the law. But
the College Savings opinion's acknowledgment of continuing circum-
stances under which the Court would still find constructive waiver
belies any such intention. To the contrary, an examination of these
exceptions yields a rule as to what sort of constructive waiver the
Court will still allow. Specifically, it will allow a state to constructively
waive its immunity by voluntarily accepting a gift or gratuity from the
federal government where it is clear from the terms of that gift that,
by doing so, it is subjecting itself to suit in federal court. The
regulation as waiver theory fits within this rule.
A. Accepted Routes of Private Litigation under Cooperative
Federalism Statutes after Seminole Tribe
Putting the availability of constructive waiver aside, the primary
route for private litigation under the cooperative federalism statutes
following Seminole Tribe is through Ex Parte Young actions for injunc-
tive relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law.
State sovereign immunity may also still be abrogated through con-
44 See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 59 (noting that the Court had previously found congres-
sional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity only under the Fourteenth Amendment
(in Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445 (1976)) and through its Article I powers (in Union Gas)); id
at 66 ("Union Gas was wrongly decided and ... should be, and now is, overruled."). The Court
maintained that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment because § 5 of the Amendment expressly provides that "Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," id at 59, and was "adopted
well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution." Id
at 66. Thus, the Court stated, "the Fourteenth Amendment ... operated to alter the pre-existing
balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment."
Id at 66-67.
45 Id at 72-73 ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making au-
thority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of
suits by private parties against unconsenting States .... Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.").
20031 1647
The University of Chicago Law Review
gressional legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. But
that exception does not apply to most cooperative federalism statutes,
which are passed pursuant to Congress's Article I powers. States may
also explicitly waive their immunity,'7 either by voluntarily invoking
41
the jurisdiction of a federal court, or by passing a state statute or
state constitutional provision to that effect.4 However, in the mine run
of cooperative federalism suits, states have declined to waive their
immunity, aggressively using state sovereign immunity as a defense.
This means that, in practice, most private citizens seeking to sue
state regulators under cooperative federalism statutes now pursue
them as Ex Parte Young actions.". Under Ex Parte Young, private citi-
zens may bring equitable suits against state officials to enjoin an ongo-
ing violation of federal law, on the theory that, because a state cannot
authorize state officials to violate the law, such officials are no longer
acting on the state's behalf.' Ex Parte Young plaintiffs may not, how-
ever, seek damages or retroactive relief.2 Plaintiffs suing under coop-
erative federalism statutes are generally able to plead correctly under
Ex Parte Young, though those that cannot identify a specific state offi-
cial responsible for the misregulation are knocked out of court." In at
46 This abrogation would proceed on the logic that the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
authorizes congressional control of the states to ensure equal protection and due process to all
United States citizens.
47 See Part lI.B.
48 This is known as "waiver-in-litigation." See generally Gil Seinfeld, Waiver in Litigation:
Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the Voluntariness Question, 63 Ohio St L J 871 (2002).
49 See College Savings, 527 US at 670, citing Clark v Barnard, 108 US 436,447-48 (1883).
50' See, for example, Cox v City of Dallas, 256 F3d 281 (5th Cir 2001) (allowing a Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act claim to go forward under the theory of Ex Parte Young); Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc v California Department of Transportation, 96 F3d 420 (9th
Cir 1996) (Clean Water Act claim); Clean Air Council v Mallory, 226 F Supp 2d 705 (ED Pa
2002) (Clean Air Act claim); Swartz v Beach, 229 F Supp 2d 1239 (D Wyo 2002) (various Clean
Water Act claims): West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v Norton, 137 F Supp 2d 687, 691-92
(SD W Va 2001) (allowing a Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act suit to go forward un-
der the theory of Ex Parte Young, after noting that the Supreme Court had disfavored construc-
tive waivers in College Savings); Froebel v Meyer, 13 F Supp 2d 843 (ED Wis 1998) (Clean Water
Act claim).
51 See generally Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123. This arises out of the famous fiction that a
state officer's action that violates federal or constitutional law is ultra vires and therefore
"stripped of its official or representative character." Id at 160.
52 See Edelman v Jordan, 415 US at 667-69 (rejecting an injunction granted in an Ex Parte
Young action ordering payment of previously owed benefits); Quern v Jordan, 440 US 332, 337
(1979) ("The distinction between that relief permissible under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young
and that found barred in Edelman was the difference between prospective relief ... and retro-
spective relief.").
53 See, for example, Peat v EPA, 175 F3d 422,429 (6th Cir 1999) (ruling that plaintiff could
not sue the director of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality for a Clean Water
Act claim, because it "failed to allege that the Director has individually taken actions which con-
stitute continuing violations of federal law") (emphasis added); Sweat v Hall, 200 F Supp 2d
1162, 1175 (D Ariz 2001) (dismissing plaintiffs Clean Air Act claim against the Governor of Ari-
zona for failure to show defendant's link to the claim).
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least one recent case, the plaintiffs' Ex Parte Young claim was dis-
missed despite the fact that they named state officials and sought pro-
spective equitable relief because their brief "contained no sustained
argument in support of their claim.".
The obstacles to Ex Parte Young suits do not end here. In Penn-
hurst State School & Hospital v Halderman," the Court made clear
that plaintiffs may only bring Ex Parte Young actions for violations of
federal-not state-law." States, citing Pennhurst, have asserted that
their officers are immune for misregulation of state portions of coop-
erative federalism statutes. The logic of this defense is that, because
the state implementation plans are devised by the states, albeit accord-
ing to federal standards, they are state, rather than federal, law. At
least one circuit court has accepted this argument with respect to one
of the original cooperative federalism statutes, the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act.7
Two recent Supreme Court cases have rendered the availability
of Ex Parte Young suits somewhat uncertain-something that state de-
fendants are also taking aggressive advantage of." In Seminole Tribe,
the Supreme Court also ruled on Ex Parte Young, cautioning that it
was a narrow exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that
Ex Parte Young suits should not be allowed to go forward where Con-
gress had laid out a "detailed remedial scheme" for enforcement
through other means." Thus, as each federal court entertains an Ex
Parte Young suit under a given statute for the first time, it must con-
duct an inquiry into whether Congress laid out a detailed, as opposed
to limited, remedial scheme in that statute-the former indicating, un-
der the reasoning of Seminole Tribe, that Congress intended to fore-
close the possibility of prospective injunctive relief."'
54 Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management v United States, 304 F3d 31,52
(lst Cir 2002).
55 465 US 89 (1984).
56 Id at 106 (concluding that Ex Parte Young is "inapplicable in a suit against state officers
on the basis of state law").
57 See Bragg v West Virginia CoalAssociation, 248 F3d 275,297-98 (4th Cir 2001) (conclud-
ing that a congressional invitation to a state to create its own laws under a federal program
makes the state laws exclusive and state officers immune from suit under Ex Parte Young).
58 See, for example, Rosie D. v Swift, 310 F3d 230,231-32 (1st Cir 2002):
In recent years, the Supreme Court has redefined the calculus of federalism, tilting the
scales more and more toward states' rights. This appeal represents an attempt by the named
defendants-a complement of Massachusetts officials, including the governor, two cabinet
officers, and the Commissioner of the Division of Medical Assistance -to capitalize upon
that trend. As we explain below, they seek to push the envelope too far.
59 Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 74-76.
6( See, for example, Mountain Cable Co v Public Service Board of Vermont, 242 F Supp 2d
400 (D Vt 2003) (in attempting to determine whether the Seminole Tribe exception to Ex Parte
Young applies to the Cable Communications Policy Act, asking: "Does the remedial scheme in
the Cable Act more closely resemble the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ('IGRA') at issue in
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Ex Parte Young was further whittled away in Idaho v Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,' in which Justice Kennedy suggested in the
principal opinion that Ex Parte Young is not applicable to every suit
for prospective relief against an individual officer for an ongoing vio-
lation of federal law, advocating a case-by-case balancing inquiry into
federal and state interests.2 Because this section of the opinion was
joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, some circuits have rejected the
case-by-case inquiry."' However, all agree that Coeur d'Alene creates
an exception to Ex Parte Young where "the suit against the state offi-
cer affects a unique or essential attribute of state sovereignty."
''A
In sum, though the Ex Parte Young doctrine is still available to
plaintiffs seeking to sue the states for misregulation under cooperative
federalism statutes, in practice its utility is diminished by the number
of exceptions and limitations to the doctrine. States do raise, and
courts must consider, each and every exception as a defense, raising
the cost and burden of litigation to plaintiffs.
B. Status of the Waiver Exception to State Sovereign Immunity
In College Savings, the Supreme Court noted that it had "long
recognized that a State's sovereign immunity is 'a personal privilege
which it may waive at its pleasure.' '. Thus, it did not dispute the
proposition that a state may explicitly waive its immunity to suit in
federal court. But it overruled the main case, Parden v Terminal Rail-
way of Alabama Docks Department,' that allowed a state to construc-
tively waive its immunity in federal court-and in language casting
great doubt on the continuing validity of the concept." And yet, the
Court did acknowledge that in at least two situations it had allowed
Congress to exchange a "gift or gratuity" for a waiver of immunity or
other "action[] that Congress could not require them to take."' ' The
Seminole Tribe (in which case, Ex parte Young does not apply), or the 1996 Act (in which case Ex
parte Young does apply)?").
61 521 US 261 (1997).
62 Id at 270.
63 See, for example, MCI Telecommunications v Bell-Atlantic Pennsylvania Services, 271
F3d 491,508 (3d Cir 2001).
64 Id.
65 College Savings, 527 US at 675, quoting Clark, 108 US at 447. See also Seminole Tribe,
517 US at 65 (calling the proposition that the States may waive their sovereign immunity "unre-
markable").
66 377 US 184 (1964).
67 See, for example, College Savings, 527 US at 678 (noting, in a review of post-Parden case
law, that "[tihe next year, we observed (in dictum) that there is 'no place' for the doctrine of con-
structive waiver in our sovereign-immunity jurisprudence"). See also id at 680 ("We think that
the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and we see no merit in attempt-
ing to salvage any remnant of it.").
68 Id at 686-87.
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evident tension between the Court's tone in overruling Parden and its
reservation of the possibility of constructive waiver in certain circum-
stances has resulted in conflicting interpretations in the lower courts.
For the thirty-five years prior to College Savings, the Court al-
lowed Congress to obtain a constructive waiver of state sovereign
immunity where a state took part in a regulated activity. The leading
case on this was Parden, where the Court found that, because Con-
gress had clearly conditioned the exercise of the right to operate an
interstate railroad upon amenability to suit in federal court, when a
state exercised that right, it was "taken to have accepted that condi-
tion and thus to have consented to suit."6 This stood for the proposi-
tion that constructive waiver occurred where (i) Congress clearly noti-
fied a state that it would render itself amenable to suit by engaging in
a certain activity, and (ii) the state engaged in such activity.
College Savings, in which Florida was defending itself against a
suit for false and misleading advertising under the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act, expressly overruled Parden as out of synch with the
rest of the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine." First, the Court said,
it could not square Parden with its line of cases requiring that "a
State's express waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivocal."' The
Court wanted to be certain that a state in fact consented to suit, but
found little reason to assume actual consent based upon "the State's
mere presence in a field subject to congressional regulation." 2 Pres-
ence in a regulated industry that a state is perfectly entitled to enter
does not indicate any voluntary consent to suit, as the alternative
would be the congressionally imposed sanction of being excluded
from otherwise lawful activity. I take this to put the following stricture,
at least, on constructive waiver: It must be certain that a state consents
to suit; merely engaging in an otherwise permissible activity is insuffi-
cient to show this, because it lacks any indication of voluntariness.
Similarly, the Court reasoned that for Congress to "exact con-
structive waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of Arti-
cle I powers would ..., as a practical matter, permit Congress to cir-
cumvent the antiabrogation holding of Seminole Tribe."" In Seminole
Tribe, the Court meant to foreclose Congress from forcing a state to
give up its constitutional rights" by straightforwardly abrogating the
69 377 Us at 192.
70 See 527 US at 680 ("Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly over-
ruled.").
71 Id, citing Great Northern Life Insurance Co v Read, 322 US 47 (1944).
72 College Savings, 527 US at 680.
73 Id at 683 ("Forced waiver and abrogation are not even different sides of the same coin-
they are the same side of the same coin.").
74 Something that is intuitively impermissible, as Congress cannot force any person or state
to give up their constitutional rights.
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right in a statute; the Court would not allow Congress to do the
equivalent in a Parden-type situation by inferring waiver from actions
that are not truly voluntary.
Additionally, the Court said, it was "anomalous to speak of the
'constructive waiver' of a constitutionally protected privilege."7 The
Court explained:
For example, imagine if Congress amended the securities laws to
provide with unmistakable clarity that anyone committing fraud
in connection with the buying or selling of securities in interstate
commerce would not be entitled to a jury in any federal criminal
prosecution of such fraud. Would persons engaging in securities
fraud after the adoption of such an amendment be deemed to
have "constructively waived" their constitutionally protected
rights to trial by jury in criminal cases? . . . The answer is of
76
course, no.
It seems as if the Court's meaning here is that a state can never con-
structively "surrender its constitutional right[]"7 to sovereign immu-
nity-just as a con man cannot be deemed, minus explicit waiver
through a plea bargain or otherwise, to have surrendered his right to a
jury trial.
Yet, the Court went on to acknowledge that Congress could ob-
tain constructive waiver in at least one instance. The Court noted that
under Petty v Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission,"6 the Court al-
lows Congress to obtain constructive waiver in return for congres-
sional approval of interstate compacts." The Court also acknowledged
that in cases such as South Dakota v Dole," it allows Congress to
"condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain ac-
tions that Congress could not require them to take, and that accep-
tance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions."'" While the
"certain action" at issue in Dole was not a waiver, the Court's point
was that Congress may ask the states to do something that it could not
require them to do in exchange for the "gift" of federal funds." This, by
75 Idat682.
76 Id at 681-82.
77 Id at 681, quoting Edelman, 415 US at 673.
78 359 US 275 (1959).
79 See College Savings, 527 US at 686 ("In [Petty], we held that a bistate commission which
had been created pursuant to an interstate compact (and which we assumed partook of state
sovereign immunity) had consented to suit by reason of a suability provision attached to the
congressional approval of the compact.").
80' 483 US 203 (1987).
81 College Savings, 527 US at 686, citing Dole, 483 US 203.
82 Instead, it was agreeing to raise the state drinking age to twenty-one. See Dole, 483 US
at 205.
83 See College Savings, 527 US at 686-87 ("Congress has no obligation to use its Spending
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implication, was the principle at work in Petty, where Congress was al-
lowed to ask the states to waive their sovereign immunity in exchange
for the "gratuity" of permission to form an interstate compact."
Connecting the dots between what the Court forbids and what it
acknowledged it still allows in College Savings, it follows that a con-
structive waiver of state sovereign immunity may still be found where
(i) Congress offers a "gift" or "gratuity" as seen in Dole or Petty in ex-
change for a state waiver of state sovereign immunity, (ii) the terms of
the legislation make it clear that by accepting the gift or gratuity, the
state in fact consents to suit, and (iii) acceptance of that gift or gratu-
ity is truly voluntary. Voluntariness is the touchstone: Where the "in-
ducement offered by Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion,.' '' the offer of that inducement
would be an unconstitutional condition, destroying the voluntariness
of the waiver.'
C. Regulation as Waiver
Since College Savings, the Supreme Court has not approved any
further instances of constructive waiver. Some circuit courts have be-
gun to apply College Savings to find a voluntary waiver of state sover-
eign immunity in exchange for grants of federal funds.7 However, sev-
eral circuits have advanced a theory of regulation as waiver to uphold
the private litigation provision of the 1996 Telecom Act, which, they
believe, fits within the strictures of College Savings.
In two cases interpreting the citizen suit provision of the 1996
Telecom Act, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits argued that when a state
takes up the opportunity to act as a regulator in a field from which it
would otherwise be preempted by federal legislation, it is accepting a
"gift or gratuity" for which Congress may obtain a constructive waiver
of immunity after College Savings.'
Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts.").
84 See Petty, 359 US at 277 (discussing the terms of the compact); College Savings, 527 US
at 686 ("[Petty] seem[s] to us fundamentally different from the present [case]. Under the Com-
pact Clause.... States cannot form an interstate compact without first obtaining the express con-
sent of Congress; the granting of such consent is a gratuity.").
85 College Savings, 527 US at 687 (internal citations omitted).
86 Id.
87 See, for example, Koslow v Pennsylvania, 302 F3d 161 (3d Cir 2002), cert denied, 537 US
1232 (2003) ("[Tjhe Commonwealth could avoid § 504 claims against the Department of Correc-
tions by declining all federal funds to the Department of Corrections.... By accepting SCAAP
funds, the Commonwealth opens the Department of Corrections to suits under the Rehabilita-
tion Act.").
8 See MCI Telecommunications Corp v Illinois Bell Telephone Co, 222 F3d 323,343 (7th
Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1132 (2001) (holding that Congress may obtain a constructive
waiver by granting a state the "gratuity" of participating in regulatory activity that would other-
wise be foreclosed by federal occupation of the field); MCI Telecommunications Corp v Public
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The argument in essence has two parts. First, because the Telecom
Act includes provisions both offering the states the opportunity to
participate in regulation of the local telecommunications market, and
subjecting state regulators to suit for their regulation when the states
accept the opportunity to regulate, when states enact regulations, they
are indicating their willingness to be subject to suit. Second, Congress
offered the states a valid "gratuity" in exchange for that waiver: Once
Congress had decided to pass comprehensive telecommunications leg-
islation, states could no longer regulate the industry unless Congress
carved out a specific role for them. " The offer to the states of the op-
portunity to regulate is, therefore, a "gratuity," and states' acceptance
of that offer voluntary.
The Third and Fifth Circuit have embraced the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits' regulation as waiver theory. ' The Fourth and Sixth
Circuits, however, have rejected the theory."'
The Sixth Circuit rejected the theory rather peremptorily.2 In Bell
Atlantic Maryland v MCI Worldcom," the Fourth Circuit argued that
nothing about the state's decision to take up the opportunity to regu-
Service Commission of Utah, 216 F3d 929, 938 (10th Cir 2000), cert denied, 531 US 1183 (2001)
(holding that, because "Congress could have preempted all state regulation of local phone ser-
vice," the opportunity to regulate under the Act was a "federal gratuity" in exchange for which
the states could constructively waive their immunity).
89 See MCI v Utah, 216 F3d at 938 ("[W]ith the passage of the 1996 Act, Congress essen-
tially transformed the regulation of local phone service from an otherwise permissible state ac-
tivity into a federal gratuity."); MCI v Illinois Bell, 222 F3d at 343 (holding that, because "Con-
gress[] exercising its authority to regulate commerce has precluded all other regulation except on
its terms," the authority of states to regulate is not derived "from their own sovereign author-
ity").
' See MCI Telecommunications Corp v Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania Services, Inc, 271 F3d
491,505 (3d Cir 201) (having laid out the regulation as waiver theory, noting that the Fifth. Sev-
enth, and Tenth Circuits had also accepted it); AT&T Communications v BellSouth Telecommu-
nications, 238 F3d 636,645 (5th Cir 2001):
[W]e agree with the Tenth and Seventh Circuits' conclusion that, after College Savings,
Congre!.,. may still obtain a non-verbal voluntary waiver of a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, if the waiver can be inferred from the state's conduct in accepting a gratuity after
being given clear and unambiguous statutory notice that it was conditioned on waiver of
immunity.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that because "Congress pre-empted the states in the regulation of
local telecommunications competition with regard to all matters addressed by the Act," the state
defendant "waived its state immunity when it accepted the Congressional offer of a gratuity." Id
at 639.647.
91 See Bell Atlantic Maryland v MCI Worldcom, 240 F3d 279 (4th Cir 2001); Michigan Bell
v Climax Telephone, 202 F3d 862 (6th Cir 2000).
92 See Climax Telephone, 202 F3d at 867 n 2 (while agreeing with the result in the original
Seventh Circuit case, heard prior to College Savings, that the suit should go forward, noting that
it did "not base [its] decision on the reasoning in that case because the [Seventh Circuit] reached
its decision by applying the constructive waiver doctrine, which has since been limited by the Su-
preme Court").
93 240 F3d 279 (4th Cir 2001).
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late as offered by the Act indicated an "unequivocal indication that
[the] State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction" that it thought
the Supreme Court required. 4 It went on to cite College Savings as
support for this proposition-echoing that "there is little reason to as-
sume actual consent based upon the State's mere presence in a field
subject to congressional regulation."'" But this misses the mark. There
may be little reason to assume actual, unequivocal consent to suit
based upon state participation in a regulated activity such as running
an interstate railroad (as in Parden) or more general commercial ac-
tivities (as in College Savings). It does not necessarily follow, however,
that a state's acceptance of an invitation to participate as a regulator in
a field from which it would otherwise be excluded by preemptive fed-
eral regulation does not rise to the level of unequivocal, voluntary
consent required by College Savings. But the Fourth Circuit did not
move beyond the College Savings citation to address that line of rea-
soning.
The Supreme Court appeared ready to resolve the circuit split on
whether regulation as waiver is a valid theory of constructive waiver
in the Telecom Act in 2002, but ultimately allowed the suit to go for-
ward as an Ex Parte Young action."" Thus, it is open to question
whether Congress may obtain constructive waiver of a state's sover-
eign immunity by offering it the opportunity to regulate in an area
subject to federal regulation.
III. PARTICIPATION IN REGULATION AS WAIVER OF STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
CONTEXT. AN APPROPRIATE ABROGATION
As presented in Part II, regulation as waiver occurs when a state
takes up the opportunity to act as a regulator in a field from which it
would otherwise be preempted pursuant to federal legislation that
also clearly subjects state regulators to suit. Regulation as waiver via
the Telecom Act fits within the contours of the constructive waiver
doctrine laid out in College Savings. This naturally extends to all co-
operative federalism statutes that contain provisions authorizing pri-
vate litigation against state regulators.
A. Regulation as Waiver and Current Constructive Waiver Doctrine
After College Savings, a constructive waiver of state sovereign
immunity may still be found where (i) Congress offers a "gift" or "gra-
tuity" in exchange for a state waiver of state sovereign immunity,
94 Id at 293, citing Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234,238 n 1 (1985).
95 Bell Atlantic Maryland, 240 F3d at 293, citing College Savings, 527 US at 680.
96 See note 13.
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(ii) the terms of the legislation make it clear that by accepting the gift
or gratuity, the state in fact consents to suit, and (iii) acceptance of
that gift or gratuity is truly voluntary. As I will explain here, regulation
as waiver in the context of the Telecom Act meets these requirements.
First, in the context of the Telecom Act, we must determine
whether the opportunity to participate in a cooperative regulatory
scheme can fairly be characterized as a "gratuity." In College Savings
itself, the Court drew the line between a "gift or gratuity," for which
Congress may obtain constructive waiver, and a "sanction,""' for which
it may not. A sanction, typified by Parden, is the threat of exclusion
from an otherwise lawful activity. A gift, exemplified by Dole, is the
grant of money through the Spending Clause, which "Congress has no
obligation to use '"", and which the state has the option to decline. A
gratuity, exemplified by Petty, is a grant of consent to do something
that states do not otherwise have permission to do." The "something"
in Petty was the opportunity to participate in a bi-state commission,
something that, under the Compacts Clause, the Constitution dictates
that states may do only with Congress's permission."'
The opportunity to regulate offered under the Telecom Act looks
much more like a gratuity than a sanction. Congress is not denying the
states the opportunity to engage in otherwise lawful activity-that op-
portunity disappeared under preemption doctrine as soon as Congress
occupied the field. Instead, it is offering them permission to partici-
pate in the regulation of local telecommunications, an offer that it has
no obligation to make. Congress's grant of permission to the states to
continue to regulate local telecommunications is therefore a gratuity
within the meaning established in College Savings.
Second, to determine what constitutes a clear enough indication
that, by accepting a gratuity, the state consents to suit, it is useful to
again look to Petty. In Petty, a bi-state commission formed to build a
bridge was deemed to have waived its state sovereign immunity''
through commencing to operate under the congressional document
authorizing the compact through which it was formed. As explained
by the Court in Petty:
The compact prepared by the two States and submitted to the
Congress provided in Art. I, §§ 1 and 2, that respondent should
have the power to build a bridge and operate ferries across the
97 College Savings, 527 US at 687.
98 Id at 686-87.
99 See id ("States cannot form an interstate compact without first obtaining the express
consent of Congress; the granting of such consent is a gratuity.").
10M US Const Art I, § 10, cl 3 ("No State shall, without the consent of Congress,... enter into
any agreement or compact with another State.").
101 The Court assumed the commission partook of state sovereign immunity.
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Mississippi at specified points and in Art. I, § 3, that it should
have the power "to contract, to sue and be sued in its own
name.""'2
In College Savings, the Court explained that in Petty, constructive
waiver adhered "by reason of [the] suability provision attached to the
congressional approval of the compact.""" In other words, that the
compact simultaneously provided for the creation and suability of the
commission was sufficient to create constructive waiver, even absent
an explicit provision stating that, by commencing activity, the commis-
sion waived its immunity.
The 1996 Telecom Act has very similar provisions. Section 251 of
the Act provides state commissions with primary responsibility for en-
forcing interconnection agreements. " Section 252 of the Act provides
that "[in any case in which a State commission makes a determination
under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may
bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine
whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements [of the
Act]." "'
Finally, we must look to see whether states' acceptance of the op-
portunity to regulate is truly voluntary, or whether the cost of turning
down that opportunity is so great that the acceptance can only be
deemed to be coerced. In College Savings, the Court cautioned that
conditions attached to federal gratuities "might be so coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion..' ' . This, the
Court said, would be an unconstitutional condition, destroying the
voluntariness of the waiver."" To get at whether an opportunity to act
as a regulator in a preempted field is coercive, or something which
states can be deemed to have accepted voluntarily, it is useful to look
at the Court's prior opinions on federal coercion of the states.
In College Savings, the Court tells us that "the point of coercion is
passed, and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed ... when what is at-
tached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from oth-
erwise lawful activity.'"" Thus, we know from College Savings itself,
and its treatment of Parden, that the threat of exclusion from other-
wise lawful, regulated activity, such as advertising services or running
an interstate railroad, is coercive. This is not all that helpful, though,
102 Petty, 359 US at 277.
103 College Savings, 527 US at 686.
i(4 See 47 USC § 251(d) ("[T]he Commission shall complete all actions necessary to estab-
lish regulations to implement the requirements of this section.").
10 Id § 252(e)(6).
16 College Savings, 527 US at 687 (internal citations omitted).
107 Id.
108 Id.
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since the fact that the opportunity to participate in a regulated indus-
try is not a gratuity itself defeats those exchanges.
Turning to the cases the Court has upheld as involving voluntary
exchanges, we know from Petty that the opportunity to participate in a
bi-state commission at Congress's invitation is not a coercive induce-
ment when offered in exchange for a waiver of state sovereign immu-
nity. Further, we know from Dole, in which the Court upheld a statute
granting the last 5 percent of federal highway funds to the states in ex-
change for an agreement to raise the drinking age to twenty-one, that
such an inducement is not coercive. "" Applying this to the state sover-
eign immunity context, the Third Circuit held in 2002 that offering
federal prison funds in exchange for a waiver of immunity was not co-
ercive, because; "[t]hough this 'sacrifice' would doubtless result in
some fiscal hardship-and possibly political consequences-it is a free
and deliberate choice by the Commonwealth that does not rise to the
level of an 'unconstitutional condition.'"''
In addition, the Court has explicitly differentiated the offer of an
opportunity to regulate through cooperative federalism schemes from
impermissible congressional coercion.' In Hodel v Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc,"2 the Court upheld the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act, under which the states
regulate mining according to national standards, because:
[T]he States are not compelled to enforce the [federal] standards,
to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regula-
tory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish
to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the
Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will
be borne by the Federal Government. '
Similarly, in FERC v Mississippi,"' the Court upheld the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act, which encouraged the states to develop pro-
grams dealing with the national energy crisis according to federal pro-
posals, in part because, "if a State has no utilities commission, or sim-
'H"' See Dole, 483 US at 211 ("[Because] all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her
chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable
under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more rheto-
ric than fact.").
110 Koslow v Pennsylvania, 302 F3d 161 (3d Cir 2002), cert denied, 537 US 1232 (2003).
111 See New York v United States, 505 US 144, 167 (1992) ("[W]here Congress has the au-
thority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress'
power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or hav-
ing state law pre-empted by federal regulation.").
112 452 US 264 (1981).
113 Id at 288.
114 456 US 742 (t982).
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ply stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal
proposals.....
It follows that accepting the exchange offered in the Telecom Act
is not past "the point of coercion" demarcated in College Savings. Un-
der the Telecom Act, states can either regulate, or step out of the way
and allow the federal government to regulate: Like other cooperative
federalism statutes, the Telecom Act "allows a state to choose whether
it will participate in the federal regulatory scheme.""6 If the state
commission chooses not to act, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion will assume the state commission's responsibility for supervising
the interconnection agreements."7 While the choice to regulate may
have certain definable benefits to the states-making sure that the
regulation of the industry is tailored to local needs, for instance-that
choice can hardly be called irresistible.
B. Potential Application of Regulation as Waiver to the Cooperative
Federalism Model as a Whole
The regulation as waiver theory offered by the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits potentially applies to all cooperative federalism statutes in
which Congress has seen fit to include private litigation clauses. First,
by definition, the opportunity to act as a regulator alongside the fed-
eral government is offered to the states in all cooperative federalism
statutes as an alternative to being preempted. The Court itself defines
cooperative federalism statutes as federal laws that "offer States the
choice of regulating [certain] activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."''. This means that
the gratuity and unmistakability requirements are satisfied.
Echoing the argument made above in the context of the Telecom
Act, the opportunity for states to regulate in fields that fall within the
ambit of the federal government's enumerated powers is a gratuity
once the federal government has decided to regulate in that area. The
federal government is under no obligation to include states in regula-
tion of those areas: States "exercise regulatory authority only by con-
gressional grace."'' .
Further, the mechanism by which this waiver is obtained is gener-
ally clear. Just as the proximate authorization and sue-or-be-sued
clauses in the interstate compact in question in Petty were a suffi-
15 Id at 764.
116 MCI Telecommunications Corp v Public Service Commission of Utah, 216 F3d 929. 934
(10th Cir 2000).
117 See 47 USC § 252(e)(6).
118 New York, 505 US at 167, citing Hodel. 452 US at 288.
119 John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from
Environmental Regulation, 60 L & Contemp Probs 203,203 (1997).
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ciently clear indicator of consent, so should side-by-side clauses in co-
operative federalism statutes offering states the choice of regulating,
on the one hand, and authorizing private litigation, on the other.
Finally, state participation as regulators in cooperative federalism
regulatory schemes is always voluntary. Again echoing what was said
above, cooperative federalism statutes give states the choice of either
regulating, or stepping out of the way and allowing the federal gov-
ernment to regulate. For example, under the Clean Air Act, the states
are instructed to create and implement "state implementation plans"
for regulating pollutants; should they choose not to, the EPA will de-
vise a "federal implementation plan" to achieve national air quality
standards in that state.""
In fact, as noted above, the Supreme Court has long recognized
the voluntary nature of cooperative federalism schemes. Twice prior to
the current "federalism revolution," the Court upheld cooperative
regulatory schemes against commandeering challenges-in Hodel, and
in FERC v Mississippi."' More recently, in New York v United States,'
22
after announcing that "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce a federal regulatory program, ' ' ' 121 the Court identified co-
operative federalism as among "a variety of methods ... by which
Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent
with federal interests.""' Cooperative federalism statutes, the Court
explained, are voluntary because they reserve to "the residents of the
State ... the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will com-
ply.''2 The inducement to regulate is not too large to turn down.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged that it is completely conceivable
that "[i]f state residents would prefer their government to devote its
attention and resources to problems other than those deemed impor-
tant by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal Government
rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated regula-
120 See Clean Air Council v Mallory, 226 F Supp 2d 705,708-09 (ED Pa 2002).
121 See Hodel. 452 US at 288 (after noting that the Surface Mining Reclamation Act gives
states the choice of either implementing a regulatory program in accordance with federal stan-
dards or stepping aside and letting the federal government regulate, holding that "there can be
no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly com-
pelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program"); FERC v Mississippi.456 US at
765 (upholding the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act's requirement that state utility regula-
tors consider adopting ratemaking standards proposed by the FERC).
122 505 US 144 (1992).
123 Id at 161, quoting Hodel, 452 US at 288.
124 505 US at 166-67.
125 ld at 168. It is also worth noting that, should states not believe that, in a particular area,
the cooperative federalism model is appropriate or worthwhile, they can prevent the passage of
such a statute through the political process. as they can be "powerful political actors" in Con-
gress. See Dwyer. 60 L & Contemp Probs at 203 (cited in note 119).
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tory program.'... Similarly, if states prefer to maintain their sovereign
immunity rather than to regulate in a certain area that has been pre-
empted by Congress, they may choose to have the federal government
bear the risk of being subject to suit for misregulation.
C. Regulation as Waiver and the Policy Goals behind the Court's
Federalism Doctrine
The regulation as waiver theory not only fits within the letter of
constructive waiver doctrine as established by College Savings; it also
serves the broader policy concerns of the "federalism revolution." By
revitalizing the rights-vindication and citizen suit provisions of coop-
erative federalism statutes, it may help preserve that legislative struc-
ture-and with it, a strong role for the states in federal regulation-as
an attractive option for members of Congress concerned with passing
enforceable statutes.
Congress's goals in adopting the cooperative federalism model
are remarkably similar to the Supreme Court's goals in advancing the
current federalism revival. Once Congress has decided that federal
legislation is needed, several main policy-design factors motivate
Congress to adopt the cooperative federalism model in place of a uni-
tary federal model. First, the cooperative federalism model allows
Congress to "tailor federal regulatory programs to local conditions."'' 7
Local regulators have unique knowledge of local conditions and
therefore of the regulatory tools most effective for combating specific
problems,'' which in turn allows them to avoid potentially welfare-
reducing, one-size-fits-all approaches.'2 Second, cooperative federal-
ism "promote[s] competition within a federal regulatory frame-
work."' Third, it "permit[s] experimentation with different ap-
126 New York, 505 US at 168.
127 Weiser. 76 NYU L Rev at 1698 (cited in note 17). See also Dwyer. 60 L & Contemp
Probs at 203 (cited in note 119) ("The need to tailor environmental policy to local conditions ...
compel[s] Congress to share some of its authority.").
128 See Joshua D. Sarnoff. Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the
Constitution, 39 Ariz L Rev 205,213 (1997) ("State officials may be better situated than federal
bureaucrats to assess local conditions and citizen preferences.").
129 See Dwyer. 60 L & Contemp Probs at 220 (cited in note 119) (noting that, in the area of
environmental regulation. major variations in climate, weather, environmental risks, types of pol-
lution, economic conditions, and preferences for environmental protection make it "highly
unlikely that a single, national approach to implementation and enforcement would succeed").
See also Michelle Cole, Environmental Oversight Is Slipping Away. Oregonian A l (Feb 26,2003)
(noting that the possibility that the EPA may have to step in and take over local environmental
permitting programs in the face of an Oregon budget crisis "is something neither industry nor
conservationists want" because, according to a member of the Oregon Department of Environ-
mental Quality (DEQ) advisory committee, "when direction comes out of Washington D.C., and
then Seattle and then down to Oregon, you tend to get a one-size-fits-all solution to everything
[whereas] DEO is closer to the issues and able to tailor things better").
130 Weiser, 76 NYU L Rev at 1698 (cited in note 17).
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proaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strat-
egy.'.' Finally, this model allows Congress to leverage existing state
bureaucracies, rather than expend resources on duplicate bureaucra-
cies. '
The first three reasons that Congress is typically motivated to
adopt cooperative federalism statutes match the reasons presented by
the Court in Gregory v Ashcroft"' for its efforts to protect "our feder-
alism." According to the Court, our federalism (i) "assures a
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society";"' (ii) "makes government more re-
sponsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry"; '
and (iii) "allows for more innovation and experimentation in govern-
ment.""'" Further, that cooperative federalism allows Congress to
leverage existing state bureaucracies should also please federalism
advocates, insofar as the alternative is to set up a federal presence in
every state."
As discussed in Part I, when Congress invites the states to par-
ticipate as a regulator alongside the federal executive branch through
cooperative federalism statutes, it generally includes provisions that
subject the states to suit. This constraint-one that Congress has
thought necessary to impose upon federal agencies as well-is meant
to protect the rights of the regulated community as well as ensure
proper implementation of those statutes. But without either Ex Parte
Young or some sort of constructive waiver theory, ensuring proper
implementation becomes more difficult.
As discussed in Part II.A, since Seminole Tribe, private parties
wishing to bring claims against the states for misregulation under
cooperative federalism statutes have been required to pursue them as
equitable Ex Parte Young suits to constrain future actions of state
regulators. In practice, however, the many exceptions and limitations
to Ex Parte Young mean that litigating through this route is at best dif-
131 Id.
132 See Sarnoff, 39 Ariz L Rev at 213 (cited in note 128) ("Congress may believe that state
regulation or implementation will result in resource savings and economies of scale. State bu-
reaucracies may already exist, allowing Congress to rely upon existing resources and regulatory
expertise."): Dwyer, 60 L & Contemp Probs at 203 (cited in note 119) (discussing Congress's
"important need to use state technical and personnel resources" to carry out its regulatory
schemes).
133 501 US 452 (1991).
1-34 Id at 458, citing Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54
U Chi L Rev 1484,1491-1511 (1987).
135 501 US at 458.
136 Id.
137 See Weiser, 76 NYU L Rev at 1695 (cited in note 17) (noting that in all areas subject to
its Article I powers, Congress could simply "preempt[] the authority of state agencies and sup-
plant[] them with federal branch offices").
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ficult and at worst uncertain. A theory of constructive waiver, there-
fore, could considerably strengthen private citizens' opportunities to
vindicate rights affected by cooperative federalism statutes and pro-
vide needed assistance in ensuring their enforcement, as Congress
imagined in including a private litigation provision in those statutes.
To judge the importance of this, imagine if neither Ex Parte
Young nor constructive waiver were available to private plaintiffs
seeking redress under cooperative federalism statutes. The safeguards
on the rights of the regulated community and the enforcement guar-
antees that Congress intended to provide would be considerably di-
minished. One might counter that the federal government retains the
option of suing the states directly to assure that they properly enforce
their portions of cooperative federalism statutes. But the executive
branch does not have the resources to police state compliance with
federal law. As Justice Souter noted in his dissent to Alden v Maine,""
"unless Congress plans a significant expansion of the National Gov-
ernment's litigating forces to provide a lawyer whenever private litiga-
tion is barred by today's decision and Seminole Tribe, the allusion to
enforcement of private rights by the National Government [made by
the majority] is probably not much more than whimsy.' 39
It is also conceivable that state regulators would be deterred from
misregulation or failure to regulate by the knowledge that, should
they fall down on the job, Congress could simply replace the coopera-
tive federalism structure with unitary federal regulation, and thereby
extinguish their role in regulation. But this does not provide adequate
deterrence, for two reasons. First, it is hard to conceive that individual
regulatory agencies would really feel that, should they misstep in car-
rying out the regulation as applied to their particular state, Congress
would replace the entire statute. Second, and more saliently, the legis-
lative inertia that must be overcome at the national level to pass a new
statute makes this an insufficient check.
What happens, then, in this alternate universe? We can stipulate
that where state regulation has been ineffective, Congress finds fed-
eral regulation to have a certain value.'"' It may, for instance, be
138 527 US 706 (1999).
139 Id at 810 (Souter dissenting).
140 The benefits that can accrue from federal regulation are familiar: It can serve a coordi-
nating function. See, for example, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 301 et seq (2000)
(preventing the misuse of facilities of interstate commerce in conveying to the consumer mis-
branded and adulterated food). It can solve collective action problems. In the environmental
protection area, federal regulation prevents a "race to the bottom" among states that would oth-
erwise be incentivized to relax controls below socially desirable levels to attract business. See
Dwyer, 60 L & Contemp Probs at 224 (cited in note 119) ("Various failed efforts to get states to
set and enforce air and water pollution standards convinced federal policy makers in the early
1970s that the only viable solution was federal regulation."). Finally, it can break down local bar-
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needed to regulate trans-boundary problems, serve a coordinating
function, solve a collective action problem, or break down local barri-
ers to competition. We can further stipulate that, in light of the fact
that Congress has included private litigation provisions in so many
cooperative federalism and unitary federal statutes, it also finds en-
forceable, accountable regulation to have a certain value. So in those
cases where Congress perceives the benefits of an enforceable federal
regulation to be only worth the costs of regulating if the states are in-
volved, Congress may choose not to regulate at all. But in those situa-
tions where Congress perceives the benefits of an enforceable federal
regulation to be substantial enough to justify the costs of unitary fed-
eral regulation, Congress would instead choose to adopt the unitary
model, displacing state regulators entirely. This result, in which the
states are allowed to continue to regulate lesser affairs on their own,
but are excluded entirely from the regulation of more critical affairs, is
arguably perverse from the federalist perspective, insofar as it rele-
gates states to a decidedly secondary role.
Perhaps some federalists would like this result. They might like a
strong state sovereign immunity doctrine-one that forbids private
litigation not only against state misconduct in regulated activity, which
Seminole Tribe was clearly aimed at, but also against state misconduct
as regulators-because it deters federal involvement in more "local"
spheres. They might also like the fact that, by forcing Congress to act
nationally (rather than cooperatively) in those spheres where the
benefits of unitary action outweigh the costs, Congress, and not the
states, will be accountable for how the scheme is carried out.
I would respond that the fact that Congress has passed these
cooperative federalism statutes shows that it sees cooperative
regulation as the best way to proceed in certain areas. By making
Congress choose between unitary federal or state regulation, we
would be forcing it to choose what is, by definition, a second-best
solution. Further, there is nothing in our federalist model that
envisions hermetically sealed spheres of authority between the federal
government and the states. While the Framers rejected a model in
riers to competition. The 1996 Telecom Act, for instance, "enabled local competition to exist
nationwide [among multiple local service providers] and erected an especially strong framework
for local competition by establishing baseline rules for every company that wanted to provide
telecommunications service." Deonne L. Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The
Challenge of Competition, 30 Creighton L Rev 1255, 1258 (1997). Prior to the passage of the
Telecom Act, most local carriers had monopoly power, having been granted exclusive franchises
in local service areas by the states. See Public Service Commission, 216 F3d at 932 (noting that, in
the regime established by the Communications Act of 1934, "[in regulating local phone service,
'[s]tates typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local service area to a local exchange
carrier (LEC), which owned, among other things, the local loops . . . ,the switches .... and the
transport trunks'), quoting AT&T Corp v Iowa Utilities Board, 525 US 366,371 (1999).
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which the federal government acted through the states,"' as the Court
has acknowledged, "under our federal system, the States possess sov-
ereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government.' ' .2 The fact
just is that there is no longer a neat dividing line between areas of
federal and state power. ' Given this reality, proponents of a robust
federalism should prefer to see the federal government and state gov-
ernments working side by side in areas of concurrent jurisdiction,
rather than see the states excluded altogether.
CONCLUSION
In College Savings, the Supreme Court cast a skeptical eye on
constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity. Yet, it concluded that
in certain circumstances such waiver could still be found. A careful
reading of the Court's language instructs that constructive waiver of
state sovereign immunity may still be found where (i) Congress offers
a gift or gratuity in exchange for a state waiver of state sovereign im-
munity; (ii) the terms of the legislation make it clear that by accepting
the gift or gratuity, the state in fact consents to suit; and (iii) accep-
tance of that gift or gratuity is truly voluntary. The regulation as
waiver theory, which should be available for most cooperative federal-
ism statutes, fits within the letter of these requirements. Since this ex-
change is voluntary, regulation as waiver does not trench on states'
rights any more than preemption itself.
Absent the availability of either the constructive waiver or Ex
Parte Young theory, private litigation under cooperative federalism
statutes would be constrained in such a way that arguably undermines
the effectiveness of the cooperative federalism model. Given the role
cooperative federalism carves out for states to participate in regula-
tion of local activity in an era in which the federal government has the
power to regulate almost all areas of American economic life, allowing
a straightforward mechanism for private litigation under these stat-
utes, and thereby shoring up their attractiveness and effectiveness, is
something that proponents of a robust federalism should support.
141 The idea of having the federal government carry out its policies through the states was
proposed in an early draft of what would become the "New Jersey Plan." See Max Farrand, ed, 3
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 616 (Yale 1911) ("The laws of the United States
ought, as far as may be consistent with the common interests of the Union, to be carried into
execution by the judiciary and executive officers of the respective states, wherein the execution
thereof is required."). This plan was rejected, see id at 313, and the fact that a model in which the
federal government operated through the states had been rejected was communicated promi-
nently during the state ratifying conventions. See New York, 505 US at 165 (collecting examples).
142 Tafflin v Levitt, 493 US 455,458 (1990).
143 See note 137 and accompanying text.
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